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Free Press-Fair Trial: Restrictive
Orders After Nebraska Press
By DOUG RENDLEMAN*
INTRODUCTION
Mary Quill, a reporter for the Trumpet, covers a federal
suit in which John Grey seeks to enjoin the county prosecutor
from commencing a state criminal prosecution which Grey has
alleged will be brought in bad faith and to harass. Much of the
evidence which will be introduced in the federal proceeding will
be inadmissible in any state criminal prosecution. Conse-
quently, to prevent the federal evidence from prejudicing po-
tential state jurors, federal Judge Pinball announces in court:
"Subject to the sanctions provided by law for violation, no
newspaper, radio or television station, or any other news media
may report the testimony taken or any of the evidence admit-
ted or presented during this trial."
These facts are similar to those presented in United States
v. Dickinson.I The reporters in Dickinson had their articles
published and were found guilty of contempt for breaching the
district court's order. The court of appeals subsequently held
the order constitutionally infirm. But, because the contempt
hinged on whether the reporters intentionally flouted the order
and not on whether the order was constitutional, the court of
appeals approved a contempt sanction. The district judge, on
remand to reconsider whether to impose contempt in light of
the order's invalidity, persisted with the contempt sanction. 2
When the reporters lodged a second appeal, the court of ap-
peals found that the earlier appeal stated the law of the case
and affirmed the contempt.' The Supreme Court denied the
reporters' petition for certiorari.4
* Professor of Law, College of William and Mary. The author thanks Janet Dun-
lop who assisted in preparing this article.
1 465 F.2d 496, 499-500 (5th Cir.), on remand, 349 F. Supp. 227 (M.D. La. 1972),
aff'd per curiam, 476 F.2d 373 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 979 (1973).
2 United States v. Dickinson, 349 F. Supp. 227 (M.D. La. 1972), affl'd, 476 F.2d
373 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 979 (1973).
3 United States v. Dickinson, 476 F.2d 373 (5th Cir. 1972), (per curiam), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 979 (1973).
1 For a critical article which focuses on Dickinson, see Rendleman, Free
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Much has happened in regard to restrictive orders since
Dickinson. The major occurrence has been the Supreme
Court's opinion in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart,5
which restricted judicial restraints on the dissemination of
material about public trials. The American Bar Association
House of Delegates adopted a set of procedures for restrictive
orders in 1976 and, in 1978, after considering Nebraska Press
fully, rendered some of the procedures obsolete with a revised
set of standards.7 Other activity in the field has been created
by lower courts which continue to grant restrictive orders and
scholars who persist in commenting.8
The problems in the free press-fair trial area are intracta-
ble. In an attempt to understand these problems differently, if
not better, this article explores some of the recent develop-
ments in restrictive orders Specifically, the comments will
focus on criminal courts' power to impose restrictive orders, the
procedure that courts utilize, procedural channels to, and
availability of, review of the merits, the collateral bar rule, and
problems in substantive law. Some generalizations concerning
the judicial process will also emerge.
Two points must be made before beginning. The first is a
brief description of a restrictive order. Restrictive orders in a
criminal context result from the trial judge's conscientious con-
cern to preserve for defendants an untainted trial. Restrictive
orders limit publicity by restricting the dissemination of infor-
mation. To be distinguished are trial orders such as sequestra-
tion, continuance, and voir dire, which manipulate nonpublic-
ity aspects of the judicial process. Unlike the orders in the
Press-Fair Trial: Review of Silence Orders, 52 N.C.L. REv. 127 (1973).
427 U.S. 539 (1976).
'ABA, RECOMMENDED COURT PRocEDuRE To ACCOMoDATE RIGHTS-OF FAIR TRIAL AND
FRE PRESS (1976) [hereinafter cited as ABA RECOMMENDATIONS].
ABA, STANDARDS RELAnNG TO Tim ADMINISTRAMTION OF CRIMINAL JUSTCE, FAIR
TAL AND Fa= PRESS (2d ed., Tent. Draft, 1978) [hereinafter cited as ABA
STANDARDS].
1 See, e.g., Symposium-Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 29 STAN. L. REv.
383 (1977).
1I use "restrictive order" for two reasons. First, it is general enough to include
orders sealing transcripts and closing proceedings, in contrast to a silence order which
connotes more narrowly an order forbidding someone from disseminating something
he already knows. Second, it is not a rhetorical effort to invoke sympathy; and it
neither, like "protective order," cloaks the order in rectitude, nor, like "gag order,"
identifies the order as undesirable.
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Mary Quill hypothetical and in Dickinson, most restrictive
orders are entered in criminal prosecutions.
The orders take many forms. Silence orders forbidding the
media from disseminating trial information have been issued. 0
In addition, trial judges have interdicted the media from dis-
seminating evidence given at hearings on pretrial motions."
Trial participants and others have been forbidden from dis-
cussing lawsuits with the media or the public. 2 Judges have
sealed records. 3 The media have been prohibited from pub-
lishing evidence received but not presented to the jury; judges
have restricted publication to only that which occurred in the
courtroom. 4 Judges have entered orders proscribing the
media from making or publishing courtroom sketches,15 or from
mentioning a jury's verdict," other indictments, 17 a settlement
Cooper v. Rockford Newspapers, Inc., 339 N.E.2d 477, 479 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975).
" Times-Picayune Publishing Corp. v. Schulingkamp, 419 U.S. 1301, 1304 (1974)
(Powell, Circuit Justice); Gannett Pacific Corp. v. Richardson, 580 P.2d 49, 52 (Hawaii
1978); State v. Simants, 236 N.W.2d 794, 797 (Neb. 1975) (per curiam), rev'd sub nom.
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 372
N.E.2d 544, 546 (N.Y. 1977), affirmed, - S. Ct. - (1979); Buffalo Courier-
Express, Inc. v. Stiller, 404 N.Y.S.2d 470, 470-71 (App. Div. 1978); State ex re. Dayton
Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips, 351 N.E.2d 127, 129 (Ohio 1976).
12 Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome, 434 U.S. 241, 241 (1978) (per curiam);
Central S.C. Ch., Soc'y of Prof. Journ. v. United States Dist. Ct., 551 F.2d 559, 561
n.1 (4th Cir. 1977); CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 236 (6th Cir. 1975) (per curiam)
(includes relatives, close friends and associates); State ex rel. Miami Herald Pub'g Co.
v. McIntosh, 340 So. 2d 904, 907 (Fla. 1976); State v. Bannister, 3 Med. L. Rptr. 1997,
1998 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
13 Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome, 434 U.S. 241, 241 (1978) (per curiam);
WXYZ v. Hand, 3 Med. L. Rptr. 1430, 1431 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Rosato v. Superior
Court, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427, 433 (Ct. App. 1975) (grand jury transcript), cert. denied,
427 U.S. 912 (1976); Miami Herald Pub'g Co. v. State, 363 So. 2d 603, 605 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1978) (sentencing hearing transcript); Northwest Publications, Inc. v. Ander-
son, 259 N.W.2d 254, 256 (Minn. 1977) (court retained complaint); Charlottesville
Newspapers, Inc. v. Berry, 206 S.E.2d 267, 267-68 (Va. 1974) (all new cases filed).
11 Younger v. Smith, 106 Cal. Rptr. 225, 231-32 (Ct. App. 1973); State ex rel.
Miami Herald Pub'g Co. v McIntosh, 340 So. 2d 904, 907 (Fla. 1976); State ex reL.
Miami Herald Pub'g Co. v. Rose, 271 So. 2d 483, 483-84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (per
curiam); State v. Allen, 373 A.2d 377, 378 (N.J. 1977); New York Times Co. v. Starkey,
380 N.Y.S.2d 239, 241 (App. Div. 1976); State ex reL. Superior Court v. Sperry, 483
P.2d 608, 609 (Wash.) cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1973).
" United States v. CBS, Inc., 497 F.2d 102, 103-04 (5th Cir. f974).
, Wood v. Goodson, 485 S.W.2d 213, 214 (Ark. 1972).
' United States v. Schiavo, 504 F.2d 1, 3 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096
(1974).




agreement,'8 the name of a charged juvenile,'9 witnesses' names
and photographs, 0 or jurors' names.2' Finally, portions of the
proceedings separate from the formal trial have been closed.2
The second observation concerns the impact of Nebraska
Press on this area. Nebraska Press effectively forbids almost all
judicial restrictions on disseminating material from public
trials. 3 That decision produced responses which are more plur-
alistic and substantively more difficult than the simple ap-
proach of protecting a fair trial with silence orders. Both major
opinions in Nebraska Press contain dicta approving orders for-
bidding trial participants from discussing the prosecution with
outsiders. 4 Short of violating the sixth amendment right to a
public trial, legislatures and appellate courts may permit or
compel trial judges to close the courtroom for pretrial hearings
and sensitive procedures such as juvenile hearings. Several dif-
ficult cases have arisen. In one, a state court decided to allow
trial judges to close courtrooms when media coverage of sup-
pression hearings would threaten future jurors' impartiality.2
The constitutionality of a state statute closing most juvenile
records and hearings went unchallenged in one appeal.26 The
effect of the first amendment on a criminal statute forbidding
newspapers from publishing the names of those involved in
juvenile proceedings is currently before the Supreme Court.Y
1' Oklahoma Pub'g Co. v. District Court, 555 P.2d 1286, 1288 (Okla. 1976), rev'd
per curiam, 430 U.S. 308 (1977).
20 Sun Co. v. Superior Court, 105 Cal. Rptr. 873, 877 (Ct. App. 1973).
21 Central S.C. Ch., Soc'y of Prof. Journ. v. United States Dist. Ct. 551 F.2d 559,
561 n.1 (4th Cir. 1977); Schuster v. Bowen, 496 F.2d 881, 881-82 (9th Cir. 1974); Des
Moines Register Co. v. Osmundson, 248 N.W.2d 493, 496 (Iowa 1976).
21 Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome, 434 U.S. 241, 241 (1978) (per curiam);
Commercial Printing Co. v. Lee, 553 S.W.2d 270, 271 (Ark. 1977) (voir dire conducted
in chambers); Keene Pub'g Corp. v. Keene District Court, 380 A.2d 261, 262 (N.H.
1977) (probable cause hearing); State ex rel. Dayton Newspapers, Inc., 351 N.E.2d 127,
129 (Ohio 1976); Williams v. Stafford, 589 P.2d 322, 322 (Wyo. 1979) (bail hearing).
11 See, e.g., Oklahoma Pub'g Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308, 310-11 (1977) (per
curiam).
24 427 U.S. at 553-55 (Burger, C.J.) (majority opinion); id. at 602 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in the judgment). See also Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d
242, 248 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
2 Gannet Co. v. De Pasquale, 372 N.E.2d 544 (N.Y. 1977), affirmed, - S. Ct.
- 1979.
26 Oklahoma Pub'g Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 310, 310 (1977) (per curiam).
27 State ex rel. Smith v. Daily Mail Pub'g Co., 248 S.E.2d 269 (W. Va.), affirmed,
S. Ct. - 1979.
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The rules which govern access to juvenile proceedings, suppres-
sion hearings, preliminary hearings and arraignments, and bail
hearings remain unclear. 8 So long as this continues, trial
courts will issue restrictive orders.
I. JURISDICTION: THE ABILITY TO ISSUE REsTICTIVE ORDERS
Both subject matter jurisdiction (the power to resolve a
particular type of dispute) and personal jurisdiction (the power
to affect a particular person) are involved in unconventional
ways in restrictive orders.
The subject matter jurisdiction question is whether a trial
judge presiding over a criminal prosecution possesses authority
to issue restrictive orders aimed at circumscribing publicity.
Courts find subject matter jurisdiction easier to assume than
to examine.29 Courts with general constitutional and statutory
jurisdiction to adjudicate criminal cases and .to grant injunc-
tions possess subject matter jurisdiction to enjoin a criminal
action. 0 Courts with limited criminal and no equitable juris-
diction, however, lack subject matter jurisdiction to grant re-
strictive orders so long as restrictive orders are characterized as
injunctions.31 As a matter of policy, if the court possesses power
to protect a criminal accused's right to an orderly and nonpre-
judicial trial, it should be able to regulate, in the furtherance
of this goal, certain conduct outside the courtroom. 3
Accepting that the courts have the power to issue restric-
tive orders, the question becomes one of whom the court can
make subject to the order. A recent student note incorrectly
argues that restrictive orders against the media exceed the in-
herent power of the judiciary because the orders regulate the
2 Schmidt, Nebraska Press Association: An Expansion of Freedom and Contrac-
tion of Theory, 29 STAN. L. Rav. 431, 470-72 (1977). See also Williams v. Stafford, 589
P.2d 322, 330 (Wyo. 1979) (Raper, C.J., dissenting).
" Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 361-63 (1966); United States v. Schiavo,
504 F.2d 1, 6 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974); United States v. Dickinson,
465 F.2d 496, 511 (5th Cir.), on remand, 349 F. Supp. 227 (M.D. La. 1972), affl'd, 476
F.2d 373 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 979 (1973); Rosato v. Superior Court, 124
Cal. Rptr. 427, 437-38 (Ct. App. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
3 Cf. Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQurry 364-74 (1950) (subject matter jurisdic-
tion under the Norris-LaGuardia Act).
3, Id. at 312-13.




conduct of nonparties. Assuming that the media is a nonparty
begs the personal jurisdiction question. Due process require-
ments of personal jurisdiction grow out of two policies: the
sovereign must limit the exercise of its judicial authority to
persons properly before it; and the initiating litigant must no-
tify affected people so that they can participate in the process.
Service of process upon a defendant in the court's bailiwick
satisfies both requirements. Referring to the hypothetical
which* began this article, Mary Quill was not a party to the
criminal prosecution, and thus arguably not properly before
the court, and Judge Pinball did not serve formal notice on her
or allow her an opportunity to participate in shaping the order.
Restrictive orders, with injunction-like features, arguably
manage to avoid the above requirements. Equity often accomo-
dates traditional analysis of personal jurisdiction to ex parte
and attenuated procedure by ignoring it; the court simply asks
as part of the contempt inquiry whether a person must comply
with an injunction .3 In Dickinson, the court had "no problem"
with this type of personal jurisdiction: "the District Court cer-
tainly has power to . . .enforce those orders against all who
have actual and admitted knowledge of its prohibitions."-"
Thus, the judge elevates the media to party status and subjects
reporters to the risk of contempt simply by saying so.
Generally, such broad theories of contempt have been re-
jected. One basis for rejection is that courts, in attempting to
compel the world at large to obey their decrees, are exercising
"sovereign powers to declare conduct illegal"-powers reserved
to the legislature.37 Restrictive orders which judges announce
13 Note, Protective Orders Against the Press and the Inherent Powers of the
Courts, 87 YALE L.J. 342 (1977).
31 See generally, Rendleman, supra note 32.
-1 465 F.2d at 511, 512.
31 The Supreme Court has said that an injunction running against all persons with
notice is "clearly erroneous" because it "assumes to make punishable as a contempt
the conduct of persons who act independently and whose rights have not been adjudged
according to law." Chase Nat'l Bank v. Norwark, 291 U.S. 431, 436-37 (1934) (footnote
omitted). Furthermore, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d) rejects an expansive
theory of obligation, stating that only "the parties to the action, their officers, agents,
servants, employees, and attorneys, and. . . those persons in active concert or partici-
pation with them who receive actual notice" are obligated to obey. FED. R. Civ. P.
65(d).
31 Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832, 832-33 (2d Cir. 1930).
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rather than formulate after adversary process and which com-
pel amorphous groups to comply assume the appearance of
legislation.
A second notion which leads to rejection of the Dickinson-
type contempt is that, generally, only parties and those ade-
quately represented by parties receive adequate notice to com-
ply with in personam orders. In the press of time, formal service
is too cumbersome; in the analogous field of temporary re-
straining orders, telephone notice has been approved. Entities
not notified and not in a sufficient relationship with one noti-
fied may ignore a restrictive order and defend contempt on the
ground that the order is void for lack of personal jurisdiction. 9
Therefore, a restrictive order against "all members of the news
media"40 violates ideas of both separation of powers and due
process.4' The procedure that a court accords a person affects
whether the court secures jurisdiction over that person, and
this article turns next to the question of trial court procedure.
Advisory Committee's Note to 1966 Amendments to Rule 65(b), 39 F.R.D. 122,
124-25 (1966).
1' Rendleman, supra note 32. The media is unnamed in a trial participant restric-
tive order but affected because the order affects its news gathering. CBS, Inc. v. Young,
522 F.2d 234, 238 (6th Cir. 1975). But see, Rosato v. Superior Court, 124 Cal. Rptr.
427, 438 (Ct. App. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976). The question of whether
the media possesses standing to challenge such an order will be considered below.
A participant in litigation may waive the right to challenge the court's jurisdiction
over the person. See, e.g., Wyrough & Loser, Inc. v. Pelmor Labs, Inc., 376 F.2d 543,
547 (3d Cir. 1967). The media in Nebraska Press responded to nonparty status by
"intervening" in the criminal case. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that even
though permission to intervene was erroneously granted, the media voluntarily as-
sented to in personam jurisdiction and was obligated to comply with the restrictive
order. State v. Simants, 236 N.W.2d 794, 802 (Neb. 1975), reu'd on other grounds sub.
nom. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). See also, Oklahoma Pub'g
Co. v. District Court, 555 P.2d 1286, 1289 (Okla. 1976), rev'd per curiam on other
grounds, 430 U.S. 308 (1977). Compare Miami Herald Pub'g Co. v. State, 363 So. 2d
603, 604 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) and People v. Green, 4 Med. L. Rptr. 1561 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1978) (media allowed to intervene in a criminal case) with United States v.
Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (judge directed movants to turn request
to intervene into a miscellaneous civil action), rev'd on other grounds sub. nom. Nixon
v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978). Miami Herald and Green have
almost the same practical effect as granting standing to contest a restrictive order.
1 See Oklahoma Pub'g Co. v. District Court, 555 P.2d 1286, 1289 n.1 (Okla. 1976),
reu'd per curiam, 430 U.S. 308 (1977).
11 Alemite Mfg. v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832, 832-33 (2d Cir. 1930). See also State v.
Simants, 236 N.W.2d 794, 802 (Neb. 1975), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Nebraska
Pres Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). The Supreme Court reversed but apparently
approved this concept. 427 U.S. at 565-66, 566 n.10.
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IU. THE PROCEDURES FOR FORMULATION AND
REVIEW OF RESmIcTIvE ORDERS
A. Trial Court Procedures
Many judges, according the media the same procedural
protections Judge Pinball extended to Mary Quill, have simply
announced the order sua sponte12 In 1975, a federal court of
appeals rejected the argument that the court should provide
notice and an opportunity to be heard to the media before
issuing a restrictive order because "we have been unable to find
any authority to support it.''13 This dismal state of affairs did
not persist long.
The need for participation by all affected is obvious. Deci-
sionmakers often fail to consider peoples' interests when those
people are not heard.44 Fair adjudication is more likely to occur
when the tribunal hears all those affected. Facts are difficult
to find and evaluate. Restrictive orders, like injunctions, turn
on subtle and controversial considerations and upon a deli-
cate assessment of the particular situation in light of legal
standards which are inescapably imprecise. In the absence of
evidence and argument offered by both sides and of their
participation in the formulation of value judgments, there is
insufficient assurance of the balanced analysis and careful
conclusions which are essential in the area of First Amend-
ment adjudication. 5
Those who argue against formal restrictive order procedure
assert that it will complicate and delay criminal trials. Indeed,
the search for an adequate procedure was complicated by need
for speed, the media's nonparty status, and complexity of the
legal and factual inquiry which must consider measures short
42 See, e.g., United States v. Schiavo, 504 F.2d 1, 3 (3d Cir. 1974); Central S.C.
Ch., Soc'y Prof. Joum. v. Martin, 431 F. Supp. 1182, 1190-91 (D.S.C. 1977); New York
Times Co. v. Starkey, 380 N.Y.S.2d 239, 241 (App. Div. 1976).
CBS, Inc., v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 241 n.2 (6th Cir. 1975). See also STAFF OF
SENATE SUBCOMM. ON CONST. RIGHTS, COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., 2D SaSS.,
BACKGROUND REPORT ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE EXPRESSION 62 (Comm. Print. 1976)
[hereinafter cited as BACKGROUND REPORT].
' Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972).




of restrictive orders."6 However, the alternative to broadening
procedure is to ignore the interests of the public and the media.
Such an approach is intolerable.
Procedures used in formulating restrictive orders have
taken many forms. Some judges initiated informal procedures;
one judge called reporters into chambers to discuss alterna-
tives. 7 Others followed more formal procedures, such as those
used in equity to grant injunctions. 8
In Nebraska Press, Justice Brennan observed that if the
Constitution were construed to allow restrictive orders, courts
would have to provide to the press notice and an opportunity
to be heard." The American Bar Association (ABA) in 1976
recommended that before entering an order enforceable by con-
tempt, the judge circulate the proposed order and give public
notice, receive written comments, conduct a hearing, and draft
specific findings and a detailed order." Courts began to hold
that notice, an opportunity to be heard, and written findings
are constitutional prerequisites for restrictive orders. 51 Judge
Pinball's order to Mary Quill fails under these decisions.
Nebraska Press also appeared to place the burden of justi-
fying a restrictive order on the proponent and to require the
"1 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 563-65 (1976)(measures short of
restrictive order discussed).
' State v. Joyce, 390 A.2d 151, 153 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978).
Cooper v. Rockford Newspapers, Inc., 339 N.E.2d 477, 478-79 (Ill. App. Ct.
1975).
' Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 608 (Brennan, J., concurring).
ABA REcOMMENDATIONS, supra note 6, at 10-11.
s' United States v. Schiavo, 504 F.2d 1, 8 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096
(1974); id. at 14-15 (Adams, C.J., concurring); State ex rel. Miami Herald Pub'g Co.
v. McIntosh, 340 So. 2d 904, 910 (Fla. 1976); State v. Bannister, 3 Med. L. Rptr. 1997,
1998 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Des Moines Register and Tribune Co. v. Osmundson,
248 N.W.2d 493, 500 (Iowa 1976); Northwest Publications, Inc. v. Anderson, 259
N.W.2d 254, 257 (Minn. 1977); Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 372 N.E.2d 544, 550 (N.Y.
1977), affirmed, - S. Ct. - (1979); New York Times Co. v. Starkey, 380 N.Y.S.2d
239, 244 (App. Div. 1976); State ex reL. Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips, 351
N.E.2d 127, 130-31 (Ohio 1976). See also STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMM. ON CONSTrrUTIONAL
RIGHTS, COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., 2D SaSs., REPORT ON FREE PREss-FAIR
TRIAL 12 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as STAFF REPORT]. But see United
States v. Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202, 1211 (5th Cir. 1977). [Ed. note: The Supreme Court
majority opinion in Gannett, which spoke for only four Justices on this point and
turned on the sixth amendment, held that the amendment guaranteed a ublic trial
to protect the party charged, not to protect the public, and assumed that the adverse
parties would protect whatever public interest existed.]
1978-79]
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judge to make specific findings.2 The ABA procedure falls
short of this by permitting the judge to draft the order before
allowing the media to participate. A judge could thus present
the press with a fait accompli, hear opposition, and then issue
the order originally proposed. The latter approach circumvents
all the reasons for requiring formal procedure in the first place.
Findings based on the evidence presented allow the adversary
system to function, force the decisionmaker to consider care-
fully, and provide a basis for review of the order. The judge
should approach the hearing with as open a mind as the cir-
cumstances permit and decide on the basis of evidence pre-
sented. In particular, the judge should be free of any vested
interest in a specific order.
Because of the pressure for expedition and the irregular
party structure, restrictive order procedure is in a class by it-
self. Courts apply equity concepts such as the collateral bar
rule and use injunction language. 3 The ABA recommendations
paraphrase injunction procedure.5 Restrictive order procedure
often resembles that followed when a party applies for a pre-
liminary injunction.5 5 Part of the reason for this resemblance
is that the Supreme Court takes a broad view of orders subject
to injunction procedure.56 For example, as the Supreme Court
hinted in Nebraska Press, the rules governing who is con-
strained to obey an injunction57 may determine who must com-
ply with a restrictive order.58 Courts considering restrictive or-
ders would do well to follow the general policies behind injunc-
52 427 U.S. at 569. See also State ex rel. Miami Herald Pub'g Co. v. McIntosh,
340 So. 2d 904, 912 (Fla. 1976) (Sundberg, J., concurring). Northwest Publications, Inc.
v. Anderson, 259 N.W.2d 254, 257-58 (Minn. 1977); State ex rel. Beacon Journal Pub'g
Co. v. Kainrad, 348 N.E.2d 695, 697 (Ohio 1976); Oklahoma Pub'g Co. v. District
Court, 555 P.2d 1286, 1290 (Okla. 1976), rev'd per curiam on other grounds, 430 U.S.
308 (1977); Williams v. Stafford, 589 P.2d 322, 326 (Wyo. 1979).
m See, e.g., Oklahoma Pub'g Co. v. District' Court, 429 U.S. 967, 967, (1976)
(granting stay).
11 Compare, Recommendation 6, ABA RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 6 at 10, with
FED. R. Civ. P. 52 and 65(b). Compare Recommendation 6, ABA RECOMMENDATIONS,
supra note 6 at 11, with F. R. CiV. P. 65(b).
See 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 2949 (1973).
See Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 177-80 (1973); Interna-
tional Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 1291 v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n, 389 U.S.
64, 75-76 (1967); Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9, 13-15 (1945).
5 See Rendleman, supra note 32.
427 U.S. at 565-66.
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tion procedure. These flexible procedures have been worked out
over generations of experience to govern fluid situations."
An excellent technique for establishing a sound restrictive
order procedure is for the state supreme court to use its rule-
making powers. The Minnesota Supreme Court recently pro-
mulgated a procedure for restricting access to records." Under
the Minnesota procedure, someone must move for an order
sealing records. Notice is given to "interested persons, includ-
ing the news media." While the moving party carries the bur-
den of proof, others may present evidence and argument, and
a court reporter keeps a record of the hearing. The judge must
base findings on the evidence and reject alternatives. The rule
specifically provides for a direct review by the Minnesota Su-
preme Court." Procedure for orders to exclude the public from
pretrial hearings is less protective, not specifying notice to the
media and allowing the judge to close a hearing upon finding
a "substantial likelihood that matter inadmissible at a later
trial will, if disseminated, interfere with a potential jury's im-
partiality."6 If appellate courts had followed Minnesota's ex-
ample and used rulemaking powers to add constitutional re-
strictive order rules to procedural structures, a majority of the
appellate opinions discussed and cited in this article would be
unwritten, unnecessary, and perforce uncited.
B. Attempts to Attack the "Indirect" Restrictive Order
A problem arises concerning whether the media may assail
orders which enjoin trial participants or close part of the pro-
ceedings. These orders affect the media's ability to gather news
without being directly addressed to the media. Courts have
discussed this problem in terms of standing, but standing
launches an inquiry both too narrow and too unfocused to en-
compass an understanding of the interests affected.
Since the order threatens the media's access to sources of
5' It would be unwise to adopt completely injunction procedure. In United States
v. Schiavo, 504 F.2d 1, 8 n.17 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 419 U.S. 1096 (1974), the Court
refused to do so.
"MINN. R. CM. P. 25.03 (eff. Jan. 1, 1979).
" Id. at 25.03-5.
82 Id. at 25.01. [Ed. note: The muddle created by the divided opinion in Gannett




information, the focus should be on the strength of the rights
affected, 3 not on standing. Accordingly, one response in denial
of media intervention is that since the media is left with the
same right of access as everyone else," the order impedes the
media no more than any other member of the public.
Such an approach ignores reality. A restrictive order af-
fects the media in a peculiarly draconian sense. Media repre-
sentatives may become parties and subject to contenipt by
having it said that they are parties. 5 If they ignore the order
and are charged with contempt, the collateral bar rule may
insulate the underlying order from scrutiny;" this leaves only
the questions of whether they knew of the order and whether
they violated it. Thus the peculiarities of equitable procedure
justify the ostensibly strained decision that even though the
court may lack jurisdiction over media representatives, they
possess standing to challenge restrictive orders directed toward
trial participants.
Courts which find standing hold that the restrictive order
curtails the media's ability to gather news." Therefore, if it is
necessary to discuss the issue in terms of standing, it should
suffice to say that "the constitutional right here sought to be
enforced is of such significance that any member of the public
has a standing to question his exclusion from a judicial hear-
ing."6 That a media representative lacks "party" status to the
Cf. Rakas v. Illinois, 99 S. Ct. 421, 428 (1978) (discussion of standing in fourth
amendment context).
'" Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 2588, 2597 (1978) (plurality opinion); Wil-
liams v. Stafford, 589 P.2d 322, 325 (1979).
" See Rosato v. Superior Court, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427, 440 (Ct. App. 1975), cert.
denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
" See discussion on the collateral bar rule contained in notes 116-49 infra and
accompanying text.
11 United States v. Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202, 1206 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 968 (1978); Central S.C. Ch., Soc'y Prof. Journ. v. Martin, 556 F.2d 706, 707-08
(4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978); CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234,
237-38 (6th Cir. 1975); Commercial Printing Co. v. Lee, 553 S.W.2d 270, 271 (Ark.
1977); State ex rel. Miami Herald Pub'g Co. v. McIntosh, 340 So. 2d 904, 908 (Fla.
1976); Northwest Publications, Inc. v. Anderson, 259 N.W.2d 254, 256 (Minn. 1977);
State ex rel. Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips, 351 N.E.2d 127, 130 (Ohio 1976).
See also, STAFF REPORT, supra note 51, at 11-12.
" Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Jennings, 490 P.2d 563, 567 (Ariz. 1971). [Ed.
note: In Gannett, four Justices asserted that the public, including the press, lacks an
independently enforceable right to attend a criminal trial. Justice Powell, concurring,
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criminal case or to the restrictive order should not change the
result.
Trial judges face pressure to avoid excessive publicity.
While appellate courts reverse criminal convictions because of
excessive publicity, no appellate court has reversed a convic-
tion because of excessive restrictions on the media. Trial dy-
namics lead judges to avoid potentially unfair publicity. Unless
the media receives notice and a full opportunity to participate,
trial judges may concentrate on the interest in fair trial and
ignore "the largely theoretical and remote" benefits of free ex-
pression.6
The importance of the issues, the media's more than theo-
retical risk and, most of all, the assurance of full consideration
of the merits before adjudication compel the conclusion that
extending full procedural rights to all interested persons before
considering any restrictive order is the best course to follow. In
some cases, the courts have found for the media and refused
to grant restrictive orders requested by parties."
C. Appellate Review
The media's irregular party status and the need for an
expeditious decision present special problems regarding appel-
late review of restrictive orders. Normally a losing party ap-
peals from the final judgment of a trial court. The appellate
process lasts a little less than a year, from a leisurely 134-day
briefing schedule in criminal appeals, to oral argument and a
reasoned, written opinion.7 But consider Mary Quill when
Judge Pinball tells her not to publish a story. The trial will
proceed. To consult a lawyer, she will have to leave the court-
house. An attorney will tell her that it may be difficult to do
anything before the deadline for tomorrow's paper.
Mary Quill has three options which she may use singly or
combined. First, she may ask Judge Pinball to reconsider the
and the four dissenting Justices found constitutionally-based rights to be heard and
to be present generally.]
" BACKGROUND REPORT, supra note 43, at 62.
18 State v. Joyce, 390 A.2d 151, 155 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978); People v.
Green, 4 Med. L. Rptr. 1561, 1564 (N.Y. Super Ct. 1978).
71 P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR, M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 14-15 (1976);
Lay, Reconciling Tradition with Reality: The Expected Appeal, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv.
419, 419-20, 422 (1976).
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order. 2 The court may deny formal intervention in the belief
that an appearance by the media will add nothing to the more
important issue of guilt or innocence except delay and com-
plexity. 73 If, however, courts characterize the restrictive order
as an injunction compelling the reporter to obey, she may file
a motion asking Judge Pinball to clarify, modify, or dissolve
the order.74
Second, Mary Quill may seek appellate review. In a federal
system, she has roughly three appellate routes: an interlocutory
appeal based on permission from both the trial judge and the
appellate court;75 an appeal by right if the restrictive order is a
final decision" or a preliminary injunction;77 and review by
extraordinary or prerogative writ which hinges on the appellate
court exercising its discretion. 71 Under any of the appellate
routes suggested, an attorney will request a stay from both trial
and appellate courts and seek an expedited appeal.79
Mary Quill's third option is to publish her story. Outrage
at the substantive and procedural aspects of the restrictive
order as well as the lack of time to challenge it may prompt her
to disseminate despite the order. If Judge Pinball decides to
prosecute her for contempt, she will argue that the order vio-
lates the first amendment.
Whichever option is chosen, the motivation for each is the
same. Restrictive orders begin to injure the marketplace of
ideas immediately. The cliche, "justice delayed is justice de-
nied," is particularly appropriate. Today's hot news will be
next week's cold history."0 This damage is particularly distaste-
ful in light of Nebraska Press' holding that many restrictive
" See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 576-77 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
13 State v. Simants, 236 N.W.2d 794, 798 (Neb. 1975) (per curiam), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
71 See Developments in the Law, Injunctions, 78 IHRv. L. Rav. 994, 1080-86 (1965).
15 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b) (1976).
7 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976).
28 U.S.C. § 1292 (a)(1) (1976).
28 U.S.C. § 1651 (a) (1976); FED. R. APP. P. 2, 21.
', FED. R. Civ. P. 62; FED. R. APP. P. 8(a). See also, 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
supra note 55, at §§ 2904, 2908; 16 C. WRIOHT, A. MnILR, E. COOPER & E. GRESsMAN,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3954 (1977).




orders, including Judge Pinball's, are presumptively incorrect.
Testing orders by disobeying them evidences disrespect for the
trial judge, while writhing under the regimen of an erroneous
order destroys the full exercise of constitutional rights. There-
fore, appellate courts should review restrictive orders
promptly; and if the orders are incorrect, the court should sus-
pend their operation.'
In an earlier article, the present author concluded dolo-
rously that the media lacked a realistic route to effective review
of a restrictive order and that the proper appellate route was
difficult or impossible to discern.2 Today courts have substan-
tially clarified the process. As devices to gain review of restric-
tive orders, the extraordinary writs (mandamus, prohibition
and their functional equivalents) have triumphed.8 3 Adroit law-
yers couple requests for extraordinary writs with applications
to both trial and appellate courts to dissolve, modify, and
stay 84 A few federal courts have classified restrictive orders as
" STAFF REPORT, supra note 51, at 11.
R1 Rendleman, supra note 4, at 128-44 ("There is no realistic route to relief in the
appellate hierarchy.").
30 United States v. Sherman, 581 F.2d 1358, 1360-61 (9th Cir. 1978); Central S.C.
Ch., Soc'y Prof. Journ. v. Martin, 556 F.2d 706, 707 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1022 (1978); CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 237 (6th Cir. 1975); Commercial
Printing Co. v. Lee, 553 S.W.2d 270, 272-73 (Ark. 1977); State ex rel. Miami Herald
Pub'g Co. v. McIntosh, 340 So. 2d 904, 911 (Fla. 1976); Gannett Pacific Corp. v.
Richardson, 580 P.2d 49, 52-53 (Hawaii 1978) (prohibition); Des Moines Register and
Tribune Co. v. Osmundson, 248 N.W.2d 493, 496 (Iowa 1976); Northwest Publications,
Inc. v. Anderson, 259 N.W.2d 254, 255, 256-57 (Minn. 1977) (writ of prohibition); State
v. Simants, 236 N.W.2d 794, 798 (Neb. 1975) (per curiam), reu'd on other grounds sub
nom. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale,
372 N.E.2d 544, 546, (N.Y. 1977), affirmed, - S. Ct. - (1979) (proceeding "in'
the nature of prohibition"); New York Times Co. v. Starkey, 380 N.Y.S.2d 239, 242-
43, (App. Div. 1976) (vacatur); State ex rel. Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips, 351
N.E.2d 127, 129 (Ohio 1976); State ex rel. Beacon Journal Pub'g Co. v. Kainrad, 348
N.E.2d 695, 699 (Ohio 1976); Oklahoma Pub'g Co. v. District Court, 555 P.2d 1286,
1288 (Okla. 1976), rev'd per curiam on other grounds, 430 U.S. 308 (1977); Charlottes-
ville Newspapers, Inc. v. Berry, 206 S.E.2d 267 (1974). See also, 16 C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER, E. COOPER & E. GRESSMAN, supra note 79, at § 3933.
" Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome, 434 U.S. 241 (1978) (per curiam);
Times-Picayune Pub'g Corp. v. Schulinkamp, 419 U.S. 1301, 1304 (1974) (Powell,
Circuit Justice). Mr. Landau, representing the press, argues that restrictive orders
should be automatically stayed. Landau, Fair Trial and Free Press: A Due Process
Proposal-The Challenge of the Communications Media, 62 A.B.A.J. 55, 59 (1976). In
practical terms, this means that no order would operate until an appellate court ap-




appealable final decisions under the practical finality-
collateral order doctrine.15 Restrictive orders are final under the
collateral order doctrine because they irreparably affect rights
every day that pass without judicial protection."
Both methods are acceptable and each has its own advan-
tages. The collateral order doctrine has a benefit for the media:
once the appellate court finds the order final, it has no discre-
tion to deny review. Extraordinary writ practice solves the
problem presented by the media's lack of party status in the
criminal action. An extraordinary writ is styled as a separate
action in the appellate court filed by one aggrieved against the
trial judge; such a procedure fits the conventional parties ma-
trix.8 1 Since most states have extraordinary writs, while the
collateral order doctrine is a complex subspecies of federal
practice, the procedure followed by a large majority of courts
is to use the extraordinary writ to review restrictive orders. This
article will hereinafter refer to review as being under an ex-
traordinary writ, although it can be as a collateral order where
appropriate.
The extraordinary writs, Chafee said in in 1950, "are rusty
with antique learning and nicked with technicalities.",, Appel-
late courts possess power to interrupt trial court proceedings by
accepting and deciding writs, but because of the policy to re-
view only after a final decision, they exercise their power spar-
ingly and rarely.89 Appellate courts should use the extraordi-
"' United States v. Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202, 1206-07 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 968 (1978); United States v. Schiavo, 504 F.2d 1, 4-5 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1096 (1974). See also Kovach v. Maddux, 238 F. Supp. 835, 836 (M.D. Tenn.
1965); State v. Allen, 373 A.2d 377, 379 (N.J. 1977). See also 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER,
& E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 3911 at 489 (1976), and Supp. n.36
(1979); BACKGROUND REPORT, supra note 43, at 28-30.
" National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 44 (1977)
(per curiam). Skokie was clearly predictable after Shuttleworth v. City of Birming-
ham, 394 U.S. 147, 159-64 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring), and Freedman v. Maryland,
380 U.S. 51, 57-61 (1965).
In See United States v. Sherman, 581 F.2d 1358, 1360-61 (9th Cir. 1978); Gannett
Pacific Corp. v. Richardson, 580 P.2d 49, 57-58 (Hawaii 1978); State v. Simants, 236
N.W.2d 794, 798 (Neb. 1975) (per curiam), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Nebraska
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). See also 16 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER
& E. GRESSMAN, supra note 79, at § 3932 (1977) (appellate courts dislike review appar-
ently aimed at the trial judge personally).
Z. CHAFE , supra note 30, at 361.
, Suitors must show more than reversible error to summon review; the trial court
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nary writs to review restrictive orders simply because the orders
satisfy the criteria: they impinge on basic constitutional rights;
a prompt, detached judgment is mandated because a person-
ally involved trial judge may have overlooked the media's in-
terest; and trial courts seek guidelines for future restrictive
orders. 0
For the media, simply being permitted to raise the pro-
priety of a restrictive order is insufficient. Erroneous orders, so
long as they are in effect, prevent the media from exercising
first amendment rights. Time, a perishable commodity, cannot
be recovered. The goal of the first amendment-keeping citi-
zens currently informed-is defeated.9 Expedited review
should lead to expedited relief.
A stay can avoid the above problem. Trial and appellate
courts use stays and appellate injunctions to suspend an order's
operation pending an appellate decision. Generally a stay en-
sures an effective eventual judgment, preserves a controversy
for the court to decide, and allows a plaintiff to profit from an
appellate victory. However, in restrictive order cases a stay can
result in a corresponding problem. If a stay suspends a trial
court order and the enjoined events occur before an appellate
decision, the decision to stay may decide the lawsuit without
full appellate consideration. In the Pentagon Papers case, the
Supreme Court "stayed" the newspapers from publishing the
documents pending a final decision. This action permitted the
Court to decide a live controversy. Continuing to "stay" publi-
cation pending a final decision was "final" for each day the
interim order was effective. On the other hand, Justice Black
wanted to vacate the order without oral argument. 2 Allowing
the newspapers to publish would have left nothing for the
Court to forbid when it handed down its opinion. The govern-
must have abused discretion in an "extraordinary" fashion. See e.g., Thermatron
Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 352-53 (1976). Several courts have used
such narrow language when asked to grant extraordinary relief against a restrictive
order. See United States v. Sherman, 581 F.2d 1358, 1361 (9th Cir. 1978); Honolulu
Advertiser, Inc. v. Takao, 580 P.2d 58, 62 (Hawaii 1978); State ex rel. Beacon Journal
Pub'g Co. v. Kainrad, 348 N.E.2d 695, 699 (Ohio 1976).
"Rendleman, supra note 4, at 137-38.
" State ex rel. Miami Herald Pub'g Co. v. McIntosh, 340 So. 2d 904, 910 (1977).
See also Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 432 U.S. 1327, 1329 (1975) (Blackmun, Circuit
Judge); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 373-74 (1976).
" New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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ment's request to outlaw publication would have become moot.
This raises the question of whether constitutional procedure
must include access to prompt appellate consideration.
A governing precedent is the per curiam opinion in
National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie.9" An
Illinois trial court enjoined the N.S.P. from parading or demon-
strating; the state appellate courts refused to expedite the
N.S.P.'s appeal or to stay the injunction. The Supreme Court
held that the Illinois procedure constituted an improper proce-
dural restraint. To sort protectible expression from proscriba-
ble nonexpressive conduct, the state must "provide strict pro-
cedural safeguards" including either "immediate appellate
review" or a stay. 4 Subsumed but unstated in the opinion is
the conclusion that the injunction was too broad tobe constitu-
tional. Skokie makes it clear that restrictive order procedure
must include prompt review and a procedure either to reverse
or to stay erroneous orders.
Press representatives argue that trial courts' restrictive
orders should be automatically stayed pending an appellate
decision. 5 In almost every instance, an automatic stay would
let the media disseminate the material the trial judge sought
to restrict and thereby present the appellate court with a moot
appeal. This procedural rule is at odds with a substantive stan-
dard which approves some restrictive orders.99 The ABA com-
mittee correctly rejected the automatic stay and recommended
"expedited judicial review of any restrictive orders before the
issues addressed become moot."" To determine whether the
committee states an aspiration rather than a practical policy,
we must look at the actual results in decided appeals.
The means for speedy review of restrictive orders are stays
and extraordinary writs. The published appellate reports illus-
trate disparate approaches to these means. Many appellate
courts have reviewed restrictive orders and rendered effective
decisions within one or a few days after the trial judges had
'0 432 U.S. 43 (1977) (per curiam).
14 Id. at 44.
' Landau, supra note 84, at 59-60.
9' Note, Ungagging the Press: Expedited Relief from Prior Restraints on News
Coverage of Criminal Proceedings, 65 GEo. L. J. 81, 113-14 (1976).
17 Roney, The Bar Answers the Challenge, 62 A.B.A.J. 60, 63 (1976).
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entered the orders or they had received the appellate docu-
ments." Other appellate courts, however, have taken weeks.9
The conclusion must be a mixed one: appellate courts can act
almost instantaneously, but some lack the will to do so. When
an appellate court demurs, a trial judge can enter an erroneous
order, even one which frustrates the clear rules allowing the
media to report on proceedings held in open court, ' and do the
harm before an appellate court can reverse.
On the other hand, instantaneous appellate action cuts
against the American grain; it gives the appearance of a "shoot
now, look later" decision. The judicial process, especially at the
appellate level, prides itself on articulated reasoned results.
The tradition includes full briefing, informed judges, a collegial
decision, a circulated opinion, and announced reasons. 0' Bri-
tish appeals contrast sharply. Immediately after oral argu-
ment, British judges announce their decision from the bench.
If policies interfere with our goal of swift decisions, perhaps
American courts can adopt some of the British experience for
use in restrictive order appeals.
These observations are inherent in the functions of appel-
late courts: 1) to announce, clarify, and harmonize the rules of
decision; and 2) to review particular trial court decisions for
correctness. The first function provides published opinions to
guide attorneys and trial judges in the future; the second rein-
" See WXYZ v. Hand, 3 Med. L. Rptr. 1430, 1431 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (temporary
restraining order granted the day complaint filed); State v. Bannister, 3 Med. L. Rptr.
1997, 1998 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (2-3 days from petition to decision); Des Moines
Register & Tribune Co. v. Osmundson, 248 N.W.2d 493, 497 (Iowa 1976) (next day);
Times-Picayune Pub'g Corp. v. Marullo, 334 So. 2d 426, 426 (La. 1976) (same day);
Keene Pub'g Corp. v. Keene District Court, 380 A.2d 261, 262 (N.H. 1977) (next day);
State ex rel. Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips, 351 N.E.2d 127, 144 (Ohio 1976)
(Celebrezze, J., dissenting) (8 days). See also Note, supra note 96, at 118 (5 days).
" See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome, 434 U.S. 241, 242 (1978) (per
curiam) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (two weeks to Pennsylvania Supreme Court);
Oklahoma Pub'g Co. v. District Court, 429 U.S. 967, 967 (1976) (5 weeks to the United
States Supreme Court); Gannett Pacific Co. v. Richardson, 580 P.2d 49, 52 (Hawaii
1979) (2 weeks to Supreme Court of Hawaii); Williams v. Stafford, 589 P.2d 322, 324
(Wyo. 1979) (22.5 weeks to Supreme Court of Wyoming); Oklahoma Pub'g Co. v.
District Court, 555 P.2d 1286, 1284 (Okla.), rev'd per curiam, 439 U.S. 308 (1977) (10
weeks to Oklahoma Supreme Court); State ex rel. Beacon Journal Pub'g Co. v. Kain-
rad, 348 N.E.2d 695, 695 (Ohio 1976) (17 weeks to Ohio Supreme Court); New York
Times Co. v. Starkey, 380 N.Y.S.2d 239, 241 (N.Y. 1976) (2 weeks).
Barnett, The Puzzle of Prior Restraint, 29 STAN. L. Rav. 539, 556-57 (1977).
P. CARRINOTON, D. MEADOR, M. ROSENBERG, supra notd71, at 31.
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forces trial courts' authority or obviates the effect of error.
Courts generally combine these functions without excessive
tension. In restrictive order cases, however, the appellate court
may find that it cannot articulate a reasoned opinion promptly
enough to avoid the effect of a trial court's error. When review-
ing a restrictive order, if the appellate court acts fast enough
to avoid perpetuating error, then deciding particular lawsuits
may dominate over considerations of creating precedent.
Perhaps it is not necessary to choose between prompt re-
view and reasoned opinion. When trial courts need future guid-
ance, much may be said for the way the Iowa Supreme Court
disposed of Des Moines Register & Tribune Co. v.
Osmundson.'12 The trial judge restrained dissemination of in-
formation about jurors, but the next day the Iowa Supreme
Court prevented the trial judge from enforcing that order. It
reserved jurisdiction to write an opinion following submission
of briefs. Several months later, the supreme court issued a full
dress opinion."3 While the approach was one of "shoot now,
look later," this was preferable to one of "shoot now, never
look." The risk of such a procedure is that a later opinion will
not conform with a previously announced decision. It has been
noted that "conclusions easily reached without setting down
the reasons sometimes undergo revision when the decider sets
out to justify the decision." ' 4 Because restrictive orders place
an extraordinary strain on procedure, we commit this risk to
the professionalism of appellate judges and to the possible use-
fulness of short, unsigned per curiam opinions.
A less attractive alternative to reviewing restrictive orders
also exists. The flexibility of the mootness doctrine lets an
appellate court indulge in the reverse of the foregoing-it can
write opinions without deciding lawsuits. Part of the doctrine's
flexibility grows out of the tension between appellate courts'
deciding and announcing functions. If an appellate court exists
to ensure correct decisions in individual lawsuits, then, at the
earliest possible moment, that court should stay and decide
any restrictive order which ostensibly infringes the media's
'2 248 N.W.2d 493 (Iowa 1976).
"I See also, Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 216 (1952); Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 154
(1952) (per curiam); United States v. Sherman, 581 F.2d 1358, 1359 (9th Cir. 1978).
P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR, M. ROSENBERG, supra note 71, at 31.
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rights. Under this approach, the only restrictive order appeals
which become moot are those the parties fail to bring to the
court in time to correct."' On the other hand, if a court's princi-
pal role is to develop, articulate, and announce a body of pre-
cedent, then the timing of review is not critical. The court, to
guide lower courts and attorneys, may publish opinions which
do not affect actual controversies. 18 Mootness deisions mirror
this conflict: "the cases applying [the general mootness rules]
are not entirely consistent with each other."'' 7
Proceeding with the criminal trial generally moots appel-
late review of restrictive orders before the parties complete the
usual appellate schedule.' 8 In order to satisfy the function of
establishing reasoned precedent, the rules of mootness have
been modified arguably to include restrictive orders: society
requires a precedent to guide the resolution of individual issues
which avoid review, yet are likely to recur.' Many appellate
courts accordingly follow Nebraska Press and hold that restric-
tive order appeals are not "moot" if the problem is likely to
occur again."0
While few quarrel with the goal of developing the body of
precedent, it is possible to criticize appellate courts which file
restrictive order opinions after the events which gave rise to the
appeal have passed. Declining to decide the concrete issue with
a stay or extraordinary writ while the issues are still alive only
to turn in a ringing opinion later"' may, in particular, be ques-
10 See, e.g., National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43
(1977) (per curiam).
,s See Note, supra note 96, at 101-02.
' J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 60 (1978). Cf. Williams
v. Stafford, 589 P.2d 322, 323 (Wyo. 1979) (court denied relief to petitioners, but
established standards for future similar cases).
I- State v. Bannister, 3 Med. L. Rptr. 1997, 1998 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
" See Southern Pacific Terminal Company v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911).
" United States v. Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202, 1207 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Schiavo, 504 F.2d 1, 5 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974); Commercial Print-
ing Co. v. Lee, 553 S.W.2d 270, 271-72 (Ark. 1977); State ex rel. Miami Herald Pub'g
Co. v. McIntosh, 340 So. 2d 904, 911 (Fla. 1976); Northwest Publications, Inc. v.
Anderson, 259 N.W.2d 254, 256-57 (Minn. 1977); State v. Allen, 373 A.2d 377, 380 (N.J.
1977); Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 372 N.E.2d 544, 547 (N.Y. App. 1977), affirmed,
99 S. Ct. (1979); State ex rel. Beacon Journal Pub'g Co. v. Kainrad, 348 N.E.2d 695,
696 (Ohio 1976). But see Schuster v. Bowen, 496 F.2d 881, 881 (9th Cir. 1974).
"I See e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 546-47 (1976); Nebraska
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 423 U.S. 1027 (1975).
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tioned. Vindicating the abstract principle after refusing to de-
cide the concrete controversy extends a hollow victory to the
winner, supplies scant incentive to correct later erroneous or-
ders, and confirms the gibe that courts display one set of first
amendment values and apply another. Vigorous opinions after
restrictive orders expire offer only specious and abstract safe-
guards to people who groaned under illegal orders while waiting
for a belated decision.11 2 Giving the media "the choice of obey-
ing an order and awaiting appellate action while their alleged
civil rights continue to be infringed, or of disobeying the order
and then facing certain contempt convictions, makes any sub-
sequent victory on appeal Pyrrhic indeed." ' 3 The practice of
reviewing restrictive orders after they expire provides an argu-
ment against the collateral bar rule, just as. the collateral bar
rule provides an argument for a prompt appellate decision."4
Courts should act promptly to obviate trial court error and
review restrictive orders rapidly to shorten the sway of uncon-
stitutional but unchallengable orders. 5
HI. CHALLEN4GING THE VALDITY OF RESTIcTIVE ORDERS
A. The Collateral Bar Rule
It is entirely possible that a court will enforce a restrictive
order without considering its validity. The Dickinson court
approved the use of contempt despite the finding that the order
was unconstitutional. The doctrine which allows a judge to
impose criminal contempt sanctions on a defendant who has
violated a substantively invalid injunction is known as the col-
lateral bar rule. It holds that the contempt proceeding is collat-
eral to the breached order and rejects as a defense to contempt
the argument that the order is wrong. Contemnors may defend
criminal contempt only by arguing that the order is void be-
rcause the court lacked personal or subject matter jurisdic-
l,, See e.g., Carroll v. President and Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175
(1968) (Supreme Court's 1968 decision reversing an order that expired in August of
1966).
"I United States v. Schiavo, 504 F.2d 1, 11 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096
(1974).
"I Id. at 11 (Adams, C.J., concurring).




tion. ' '6 Sound policy supports the collateral bar rule: people
must settle disputes in an orderly fashion and show respect for
the court system.
Critics attack use of the collateral bar rule in restrictive
order contempts. First, the procedure that trial judges follow
in deciding whether to adopt an order and how to formulate it
is often hasty; judges have issued restrictive orders without
considering fully the media's interests.' "[The order is argu-
ably non-injunctive and issued by a criminal rather than a civil
court, without the usual protections of adversary adjudication,
purporting to bind, upon mere knowledge, persons not parties
to the underlying action." ' The media is often forced into the
position of violating the order because it cannot mount and
complete effective review in time to meet reporting dead-
lines. '9 Violation is its only alternative. "The collateral bar
rule places the entire burden of the judicial time delay problem
on the party whose perishable rights are at stake."'' 0 Further-
more, the "rights at stake" are constitutional rights. "The in-
terest of the public and litigants will not allow an individual
to be deprived of such rights simply because a court, at an
earlier time, made an incorrect ruling."' 2' Imposing contempt
for violating an unconstitutional order punishes a citizen for
doing something which the basic law approves. Even if the
order is correct, contempt under the collateral bar rule decides
without examining the merits of the order, thereby creating the
appearance that the judge has converted respect into revenge.
Merit avoidance techniques are not favored devices in an open
and democratic society.
Nebraska Press strengthens the conclusion that many re-
,' United States v. Dickinson, 465 F..2d 496, 511 (5th Cir.), on remand, 349 F.
Supp. 227 (M.D. La. 1972), affl'd, 476 F.2d 373 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 979
(1973).
127 Landau, supra note 84, at 58; Rendleman, supra note 4, at 150-53.
" Rendleman, supra note 4, at 152.
' See Goodale, The Press Ungagged: The Practical Effect on Gag Order Litiga-
tion of Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 29 STAN. L. REv. 497, 505 (1977); Note,
supra note 96, at 90, 121.
I" Note, Gag Orders on the Press: A Due Process Defense to Contempt Citations,
4 HSTNGS CONST. L. Q. 187, 203 (1977).
2I Vestal, Law of the Case: Single Suit Preclusion, 1967 UTAH L. REv. 1, 29. But
see United States v. Dickinson, 476 F.2d 373, 374 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 979 (1973).
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strictive orders are wildly unconstitutional. Accordingly, an
exception to the collateral bar rule has developed. In Walker
v. Birmingham, the Supreme Court approved Alabama's col-
lateral bar rule but hinted that the rule would not apply when
the violated order is "transparently invalid."' 22 Some writers
argue that restrictive orders against disseminating material
from open court proceedings are "transpaiently invalid" and
within the Walker exception.123 Under these critiques, the
media could disseminate in the face of a severely deficient
restrictive order and take its chance in contempt. If the order
was wrong, no contempt would result; if the order was correct
or only marginally wrong, the court could impose contempt.'
2'
For example, Nebraska Press and the Walker exception would
allow Mary Quill to publish despite Judge Pinball's order.
Judicial techniques to avoid wielding the collateral bar
rule are available. As the final curtain rang down on the con-
tempt litigation concerning Ross Barnett's attempts to prevent
James Meredith from desegregating Ole' Miss, Judge Wisdom
observed wryly but perceptively: "There is no doubt that a
contempt proceeding has play in the joints."'2 More specifi-
cally, judges feel free at any point in a contempt proceeding to
exercise discretion on behalf of people charged with contempt.
Courts have used this discretion to ameliorate the rigorous ap-
plication of the collateral bar rule, often without much concern
for doctrinal consistency.
Such leniency is often presented in restrictive order con-
tempt cases.'28 On occasion the courts have struck down uncon-
stitutional orders without mentioning the possibility of a con-
tempt proceeding.' 2 An Illinois court ignored apparently bind-
ing precedent, stated that it was "not persuaded" by
'22 Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 315 (1967).
1 See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 100, at 555-58; Goodale, supra note 119, at 509.
See also Rendleman, supra note 4, at 161-62.
2I Goodale, supra note 119, at 509; Rendleman, supra note 4, at 159-61; Note,
supra note 96, at 111; Note, supra note 120 at 217-18.
' United States v. Barnett, 346 F.2d 99, 107 (5th Cir. 1965) (Wisdom, C.J.,
dissenting).
126 Rendleman, supra note 4, at 153-54 (collection of earlier cases).
17 See, e.g., Oklahoma Pub'g Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977); United
States v. Schiavo, 504 F.2d 1 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974) Times-
Picayune Pub'g Corp. v. Marullo, 334 So. 2d 426 (La. 1976); New York Times Co. v.
Starkey, 380 N.Y.S.2d 239 (N.Y. 1976).
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Dickinson, and held that illegal restraints on communication
are outside the collateral bar rule. '28 The Senate Staff Report
on free press and fair trial advocates avoiding the collateral bar
rule by staying any contempt hearing or punishment until re-
view of the underlying order is completed.'29
Aside from Dickinson, reported decisions favor the lenient
approach. Research reveals no other reported decision impos-
ing contempt on a media representative for disseminating ma-
terial about the judicial process despite an unconstitutional
restrictive order.'30 This result is sound. Courts should refuse to
place anyone in the dilemma of choosing between silence in the
face bf an unconstitutional order or punishment for exercising
a constitutional right. In restrictive order contempts, the col-
lateral bar rule undermines the first amendment. 3 ' Open and
vigorous debate on public issues cannot flourish when judges
punish people who disseminate constitutionally protected ex-
pression.
While the foregoing militates against the collateral bar
rule in restrictive order contempts, recent procedural develop-
ments may be adduced as reasons that courts might use it.
Lack of notice, party status, a hearing, and an appeal are the
best arguments against applying the rule to contemnors
charged with breaching restrictive orders. As noted earlier,
however, courts are developing procedural structures to issue
and review restrictive orders. ' Notice that an order may be
granted permits the media an opportunity to show that a re-
strictive order is unnecessary, forces the judge to consider alter-
natives, and allows the media to assist in shaping any order
'" Cooper v. Rockford Newspapers, Inc., 365 N.E.2d 746, 751 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977).
The binding precedent is UMW of America Hospital v. UMW Dist. 50, 288 N.E.2d 455,
457 (Ill. 1972).
121 STAFF REPORT, supra note 51, at 12.
' Note, supra note 120 at 195-96.
'~' BACKGROUND REPORT, supra note 43, at 78.
122 Some argue that promulgating restrictive order procedure will encourage judges
to issue orders they otherwise would refuse to consider, Note, supra note 96, at 85; that
such a result will delay and detain the criminal trial, Roney, supra note 97, at 61-62;
and that it will baptize substantially incorrect orders, see TRE REPORTER'S COMMrrr=
FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, PREss CENSORSHin NawstmTrR No. X at 35 (Sept.-Oct.
1976). These assumptions are incorrect for two reasons. First, they assume that the
procedure will not work. Second, they assume that almost all restrictive orders are




before the court grants it. Prompt appellate review provides an
opportunity to correct erroneous restrictive orders. The more
procedure available, the more a restrictive order looks like an
injunction, and the more legitimate it becomes to apply the
collateral bar rule.
133
The argument for applying the collateral bar rule to viola-
tions of restrictive orders preceded by notice and an opportun-
ity to be heard is strong. The media should respect the court
and test the order in a legal fashion. In particular, the media
should not appoint itself judge in its own case and flout the
order, potentially endangering the trial process, impairing the
defendant's rights, and creating public disrespect for the court
system. Good citizens obey judicial orders until they are dis-
solved, modified, or reversed on appeal. Therefore, as part of
the procedure which leads to justifiable use of the collateral bar
rule, access to review is essential.
In National Socialist Party v. Village of Skokie, the Su-
preme Court held that a procedure to enjoin a parade or dem-
onstration must include either immediate appellate review or
a stay. 134 That conclusion is more clearly compelled in dealing
with restrictive orders. Because of the odd party structure in
restrictive orders, the sensitive rights at issue, and the propen-
sity of trial judges to ignore the media's interests, this author
concludes that, after Skokie, even if notice and an opportunity
to be heard precede a restrictive order, the media is entitled to
a review of the order on the merits before a court may impose
the collateral bar rule in contempt. 35
Despite cogent criticism of the present author's position
that judges should not issue injunctions absent advance notice
and an opportunity to be heard, 136 this writer continues to be-
lieve that unless the media receives notice and an opportunity
to be heard, it should be able to ignore a restrictive order with
impunity.' 37 If notice and a hearing precede a restrictive order,
'1 Rendleman, Toward Due Process in Injunction Procedure, 1973 ILL. L. F. 221,
248; Rendleman, More on Void Orders, 47 GA. L. Rav. 246, 282-85 (1973).
,3 432 U.S. at 44.
'5 Note, supra note 96, at 116.
131 Rendleman, The New Due Process: Rights and Remedies, 63 Ky. L.J. 531, 582-
89 (1975); Rendleman, More on Void Orders, supra note 133, at 291-309; Rendleman,
Toward Due Process in Injunction Procedure, supra note 133, at 241-53.
,31 Rendleman, supra note 4, at 151-52. But see Note, supra note 120, at 216 n.137.
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should the collateral bar rule insulate the order from scrutiny
in the contempt trial of a violator? Yes, if the contemnor had
reasonable access to review and time to seek it. In Walker, the
Court affirmed contempt without considering whether the
order was constitutional; one reason, the Court stated, was that
the contemnors could hav3 sought review but failed to do so.
If, the Court hinted, the defendants had moved to dissolve the
injunction or attempted to appeal it but had "met with delay
or frustration," then they could have violated the order and its
validity would have been an appropriate issue in contempt.'18
At this juncture, it is beneficial tj apply the above s cges-
tions to the hypothetical involving Mary Quill. Assume Judge
Pinball mails notice to the Trumpet and holds a hearing two
weeks before the trial. After hearing evidence and argument,
the judge forbids the paper to publish jurors' names. The
Trumpet does nothing during the fortnight even though the
nearby state appellate court vacated an earlier restrictive order
the day after the judge granted it. After the jury is sworn, the
Trumpet publishes the jurors' names and pictures. If the issues
are ventilated in an early adversary hearing, the judge may
impose the collateral bar rule. Judge Pinball could properly
charge contempt and interpose the collateral bar rule to pre-
vent the Trumpet from arguing that the order was wrong.'39
If Judge Pinball issues the order the day before trial, a
more pragmatic inquiry must be followed. First, contempt's
"play in the joints" might instruct a court to be lenient and
reject the collateral bar rule. If the court concludes that the
order is invalid, it should consider, despite the collateral bar
rule, "whether the judgment of contempt or the punishment
therefor would still be deemed appropriate in light of the fact
that the order disobeyed was constitutionally infirm.""'4 Sec-
ond, whether either the parties or the trial judge delayed the
restrictive order hearing until the last moment should bear on
'1 Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 318 (1967). See also United States
v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 532 n.4 (1971).
"I Rendleman, Toward Due Process in Injunction Procedure, supra note 133, at
248.
1, United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496, 514 (5th Cir.), remand, 349 F. Supp.
227 (M.D. La. 1972), aff'd, 476 F.2d 373 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 979 (1973).
Neither the district court on remand, the second appellate panel, nor the Supreme
Court took this salutary hint.
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the decision to suspend or apply the collateral bar rule. Delay
until just before the restricted event, followed by unseemly
haste to enter an order, militates against its application.
Moreover, if the event follows hard upon the heels of the
restrictive order hearing, the judge should delay the event to
allow the affected media to seek an extraordinary writ or a
stay.' If the media fails to seek appellate relief before breach-
ing, it has passed up an opportunity to challenge the order in
a timely fashion; the judge then may intercalate the collateral
bar in good conscience. If the media seeks review, but meets
"delay or frustration," the media should violate the order and
take its chances that the order is wrong.
What is delay or frustration? The media should extend the
appellate court a meaningful opportunity to consider and eval-
uate the merits. It should not simply file appellate papers and
then disobey the order if no. relief is forthcoming by "press
time."'4 2 Many appellate courts review restrictive orders within
hours, if not days. But generalization is perilous. Newspapers
in cities like New Orleans and New York with both trial and
appellate courts nearby may expect same-day service. Jones-
ville, in the southwest corner of Virginia where the trial courts
of Lee County sit, is closer to eight state capitols, including
Columbus, Ohio, than it is to Richmond. American appellate
judges are probably not ready for telephoned oral arguments.1
4 3
Finally, if an appellate court refuses to stay a restrictive order
before the event without giving an opinion on the merits of the
order, then on a contempt appeal after violation that court
should consider whether the collateral bar rule serves any use-
ful purpose.'44 These generalizations are not easy to apply, but
they focus judgment on the critical issues in deciding whether
to apply the collateral bar rule to restrictive order contempts.
"' Note, supra note 96, at 114.
" Contra, Goodale, supra note 119, at 511.
"' But ef. Revised Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, F. R. Civ. P. 30(b), (Feb. 1979) (permits telephone deposi-
tions).





Appellate review cannot always offset the harm produced
by erroneous restrictive orders. Impecunious businesses may
accede to orders to save the expense of an appeal. The delay
inherent in the appellate process will impede some dissemina-
tion even for the affluent. Even workable review cannot substi-
tute for clear substantive standards which trial courts can
apply easily and correctly. The necessity for clear standards is
especially important when one realizes that restrictive orders
are ancillary to criminal prosecutions and are often entered
without extended consideration. Trial judges ought to be able
to discern quickly and easily, without extensive deliberation
and research, what will do and what will not.
The guidance given in reviewing restrictive orders is
founded in prior restraint analysis. The use of prior restraint
doctrine in analyzing restrictive orders presents several basic
difficulties. First, courts use the words "prior restraint" to deal
with two discrete problems: procedural restraints and
substantive-remedial restraints. Procedural restraints are rules
to govern the process the government may use to sort out pro-
tected expression from the unprotected; for example, the
merely sexually explicit from obscenity. Because the govern-
ment legitimately regulates conduct on the borderland of ex-
pression, courts require careful processes or procedural re-
straints."' This article has considered the procedural restraint
problem in its discussion of restrictive orders and notice, a
hearing, and findings.
Without articulating the basic distinction, courts also use
the words "prior restraint" to characterize the question of
whether a particular rule of conduct unconstitutionally pro-
scribes protected expression. However, the two separate
spheres of prior restraint merit different analytical tools.46
Using the same standards for both substantive and procedural
analysis diffuses thought. Restrictive order procedure is infor-
mal, juryless, and may include a collateral bar; but character-
"' L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, §§ 12-31 (1978); Rendleman,
Civilizing Pornography: The Case for an Exclusive Obscenity Nuisance Statute, 44 U.
CHI. L. REV. 509, 533-35 (1977); Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unrav-
eling the "Chilling Effect," 58 B.U.L. Rv. 685, 688 (1978).
"I Rendleman, supra note 145, at 534.
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izing restrictive orders as prior restraints adds nothing but con-
fusion to the different questions of whether the procedure is
constitutional and whether the order interdicts protected ex-
pression.
A second problem presented in using prior restraint analy-
sis is the disparate treatment afforded "prior restraints" and
identical criminal or civil sanctions. Courts discussing prior
restraints generally state or assume that a prior restraint is
noncriminal in nature and that it differs from criminal punish-
ment subsequent to the proscribed activity.147 Courts say that
restrictive order prior restraints operate with rigor: "a threat of
criminal or civil sanctions after publication 'chills' speech,
prior restraint 'freezes' it at least for the time."'4 But a restric-
tive order does not necessarily freeze speech; it stops speech
like a stop sign stops an automobile driver. The order, like a
statute, establishes the standard; the conduct follows; and if
the court decides that the condudct violates the standard, the
state punishes the actor. If someone commences contempt pro-
ceedings charging violation of a restrictive order, then con-
tempt is analogous to a criminal prosecution or to a civil action.
Punishment for contempt is no more or less subsequent than
punishment for breaching a criminal statute. The sanction
imposed after finding contempt resembles both criminal pun-
ishment and civil money judgments.
4
1
Courts compound the confusion by disapproving a prior
restraint while saying that they would approve an identical
criminal or civil rule. 50 If the conduct proscribed by a prior
restraint is unpunishable as either a crime or a tort, the court
should be able to invalidate the restraint under substantive
doctrine applicable to all three remedial systems. An example
is provided by Nebraska Press. The Supreme Court used prior
', See, e.g., Des Moines Register & Tribune Co. v. Osmundson, 248 N.W.2d 493,
498 (Iowa 1976).
' Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
"' See, e.g., In re Herndon, 325 F. Supp. 779 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (per curiam) (civil
contempt in same case); Hadnott v. Amos, 325 F. Supp. 777 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (per
curiam) (civil contempt); United States v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 95 F. Supp.
1019 (D.D.C. 1951). 0. FIss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 69-70 (1978); Barnett, The
Puzzle of Prior Restraint, 29 STAN. L. REv. 539, 550-51 (1977).
150 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976); Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697, 711, 715 (1931).
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restraint doctrine against an order invalid as either a tort stan-
dard or a criminal statute. Since the first amendment forbids
government sanctions against people who disseminate informa-
tion revealed in open court, the Supreme Court unnecessarily
applied prior restraint analysis.1 5' Prior restraint doctrine
merely provides a subterfuge to decide in favor of particular
speech without adjudicating whether parallel criminal or civil
law is valid.
The third major flaw in using prior restraint analysis in
restrictive order cases is the substantial obscurity created
about what kind of things are invalid. For example, Near v.
Minnesota'5 2 decided that, in addition to executive licensing,
injunctions could be prior restraints. However, Near is ambigu-
ous because it fails to clarify whether the Minnesota statute
was unconstitutional because it permitted an injunction for-
bidding any publication by the newspaper or because it allowed
an injunction which let the newspaper publish again but cre-
ated potential judicial censorship. '53
More recent decisions add to the obscurity. Of particular
importance is Nebraska Press. Justice Brennan, in Nebraska
Press, favors clear rules against restrictive orders; he would
achieve this by holding that the only acceptable prior restraints
are those which forbid dissemination of national security infor-
mation in time of war.'54 Chief Justice Burger's opinion, on the
other hand, allows some restrictive orders,'55 but applies "the
nadir of first amendment protection" to judge "the legality of
prior restraints.' '5 6
After holding that an order forbidding the media from dis-
seminating material is an invalid prior restraint, the majority
opinion says in dicta that a similar order against trial partici-
pants is a measure short of a prior restraint.'57 This idea points
" ' Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559, 568 (1976); id. at 596 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring); Barnett, supra note 100, at 545-46, 550; Sack, Principle and
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 29 STAN. L. REv. 411, 414-15 (1977).
15 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
's See id. at 705-06, 709-13; id. at 736 (Butler, J., dissenting).
,U 427 U.S. at 588, 592-93 (Brennan, J., concurring).
"' Id. at 570.
' Schmidt, Nebraska Press Association: An Expansion of Freedom and Contrac-
tion of Theory, 29 STAN. L. REV. 431, 431 (1977).
' Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 564 (1976) (dicta).
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out a key problem in using prior restraint analysis. A restrictive
order by any other name silences as effectively; and the defen-
dant's attorney may feel just as restrained as the media."" Prior
restraint doctrine allows courts to manipulate results by affix-
ing labels.
Similarly, one court said that denying access to material
is not a prior restraint but an order short of prior restraint.' 9
Other courts have held that orders closing a courtroom or seal-
ing a transcript are not prior restraints."10 Nonetheless, these
orders, if effective, curtail expression; a sealing or closing order
is "the functional equivalent of a prior restraint on speech or
publication."'
The resulting doctrine is that the government can keep
secrets by locking the barn door, but once the horse escapes
from the barn the newspaper may publish stories about it."62
Apparently the right to disseminate material is broader than
the right to have it disclosed; and a newspaper may publish
things about which it had no right to learn. Such a result places
prior restraint analysis in a vacuum; instead of factually and
systematically analyzing the entire problem of publicity in the
judicial process with uniform standards, courts subscribing to
prior restraint will deal with trial participants and closing and
sealing orders under one theory and with trial silence orders
under prior restraint. If the government can seal and close,
denying access to everybody equally, prior restraint doctrine
" Freedman & Starwood, Prior Restraints on Freedom of Expression by Defen-
dants and Defense Attorneys: Ratio Decidenci v. Obiter Dictum, 29 STANq. L. Rv. 607
(1977); BACKGROUND REPORT, supra note 43, at 18-24, 46, 68-71.
' United States v. Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202, 1211 (5th Cir. 1977).
"' Miami Herald Pub'g Co. v. State, 363 So. 2d 603, 607 (Fla. App. 1978). See
also, Williams v. Stafford, 589 P.2d 322, 324 (Wyo. 1979). [Ed. note: In Gannett, the
majority distinguishes the direct prior restraint of Nebraska Press from the present
"exclusion" order. 99 S. Ct. - , - n.25 (1979).]
I Note, The Free Press-Fair Trial Dilemma: New Dimensions in a Continuing
Struggle, 6 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1013, 1031 (1978).
112 See Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838 (1978); id.,
at 849 (Stewart, J., concurring); Oklahoma Pub'g Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308,
310-12 (1977) (per curiam); Cox Pub'g Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975); United
States v. Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202, 1211 n.15 (5th Cir.); Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 372
N.E.2d 544, 549-50 (N.Y. 1977), affirmed 99 S. Ct. - (1979). Cf. In re Halkin, 4
Med. L. Rptr. 2025, 2032-35 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (relationship between access under com-
pulsory process and the right to disseminate). See also, Annot., 39 A.L.R. Fed. 871
(1978); Standard 8-3.1, ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at 13-14.
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may not help much except for "public" trials. Thus, obscure
prior restraint doctrine detracts from the simple idea that in a
democracy, the public is entitled to observe how the system of
justice is treating people unless compelling reasons for secrecy
exist.'63
Nebraska Press may even be ineffective in suppressing
orders not to disseminate materials from an open trial. The
Supreme Court states the effect of a prior restraint opaquely:
we assume that the nature of the restriction compels additional
safeguards but allows prior restraints when the government
leaps the hurdle of justification.' 4 While striking down the
order in Nebraska Press, the majority opinion explicitly as-
sumed that it might approve a similar, more justified, order
another day.'65 Restrictive orders barring dissemination of in-
formation from an open judicial proceeding may occur again.'66
Prior restraint doctrine hampers intelligent analysis of re-
strictive order issues. The courts have said something like, "We
10 "A popular Government without popular information or the means of acquiring
it, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy; or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever
govern ignorance. And a people who mean to be their own governors, must arm them-
selves with the power knowledge gives." WRTINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (G. Hurst ed.
1910).
' Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 569-70 (1976).
' Id. The majority opinion, however, lacks solidarity. Two of the five Justices
who concurred in the opinion state different and somewhat less restrictive views. Id.
at 570-71 (White, J., concurring); id. at 571-52 (Powell, J., concurring). Indeed, the
Chief Justice's opinion may not even speak for a majority of the Court. See 0. Fiss,
THE CIVIL RIGHTS INjuNcTON 103 n.2 (1978); BACKGROUND REPORT, supra note 43, at
84.
The Bar Association's standards appear to reflect this ambiguity. The 1976 proce-
dural standards expressed no opinion on substantive law. Roney, supra note 97, at 71.
Justice Brennan's opinion, which expressed the views of three of the Justices,
would have held that the government could not prohibit dissemination of "any infor-
mation pertaining to pending judicial proceedings or the operation of the criminal
justice system no matter how shabby the means by which the information is obtained."
427 U.S. at 588 (Brennan, J., concurring). Unlike Justice Brennan, Justice Stevens was
unwilling to allow a reporter who steals information to escape contempt; however, he
did accept the balance of Justice Brennan's views. Id. at 617 (Stevens, J., concurring).
The Bar Association's 1978 Standards 8-4.2, which exonerates reporters from contempt
unless they are guilty of "bribery, theft, or fraud" in acquiring the information, ap-
pears to adopt Justice Stevens' views instead of the putative majority's.
" Erickson, Fair Trial and Free Press: The Practical Dilemma, 29 STAN. L. REv.
485, 491 (1977); Linde, Advice to the Press, THE CENTER MAGAZINE, Jan.-Feb., 1979 at
2; Note, supra note 120, at 191; Note, Protective Orders Against the Press and the




can't tell you what a prior restraint is but we know we don't
like them." Courts should cease speaking of prior restraint in
restrictive order opinions and instead ask whether the proce-
dure followed was protective enough to ensure fair and intelli-
gent decision and whether the order prohibits protected expres-
sion or conduct.
CONCLUSION
The view that litigation is of interest only to the parties
involved has lost ground in this age of government in the sun-
shine. '67 Indeed, as Frank Allen said, "the central problem of
criminal law is and will remain political in character. It is the
problem of achieving the objectives of public order through the
use of power so regulated as to preserve and nourish the basic
political values." '68 The press plays a significant role in the
establishment of the criminal process as a part of the political
sphere.
This system, with all its procedural protections and legal
rules, is put under great stress by the use of restrictive orders.
Inflexible dogma occasionally intrudes in restrictive order anal-
ysis to prevent prompt decisions on the merits. The result dims
the appearance of justice. More often, inapplicable lore clouds
the reasoning process.
Still, several developments have brought troubled areas
into sharper focus. The courts, with the organized bar's help,
have developed personal jurisdiction analysis and pre-order
procedure; restrictive orders are now formulated in an adver-
sary crucible. Appellate courts have adopted extraordinary,
writ appeals to restrictive orders. However, these developments
do not leave us without problems. Appellate courts should re-
view restrictive orders promptly instead of writing an opinion
after the controversy has become moot. Finally, applying prior
restraint doctrine to review restrictive orders is one of the law's
'" See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Interest Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
Rav. 1281, 1283 (1976). See, e.g., Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435
U.S. 829 (1978). [Ed. note: But see Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale: the majority opinion
and Justice Rhenquist's concurring opinion rely on the parties to enforce the right to
a public trial. The dissent disagrees, citing the victim's and the public's interest in
preventing improper court procedure].
I" F. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE viii (1964).
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disaster areas. Courts cannot forge rational and socially respon-
sive restrictive order doctrine so long as they redact the faded
pieties and failed metaphors of prior restraint.

